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JOHN N. WILLIAMS
WITTGENSTEIN, MOOREAN ABSURDITY
AND ITS DISAPPEARANCE FROM SPEECH
ABSTRACT. G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, ‘‘I went to the pictures
last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’’ would be ‘‘absurd’’. Why should it be
absurd of me to say something about myself that might be true of me? Moore
suggested an answer to this, but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was
greatly impressed by Moore’s discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true
assertions because he saw that it illuminates ‘‘the logic of assertion’’. Wittgenstein
suggests a promising relation of assertion to belief in terms of the idea that one
‘‘expresses belief ’’ that is consistent with the spirit of Moore’s failed attempt to
explain the absurdity. Wittgenstein also observes that ‘‘under unusual circum-
stances’’, the sentence, ‘‘It’s raining but I don’t believe it’’ could be given ‘‘a clear
sense’’. Why does the absurdity disappear from speech in such cases? Wittgenstein
further suggests that analogous absurdity may be found in terms of desire, rather
than belief. In what follows I develop an account of Moorean absurdity that, with
the exception of Wittgenstein’s last suggestion, is broadly consistent with both
Moore’s approach and Wittgenstein’s.
1. INTRODUCTION
G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, ‘‘I went to the pictures
last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’’ would be ‘‘absurd’’ (1942,
543). Over half a century later, the nature of such absurdity remains
controversial. On the one hand such sayings seem distinct from
semantically odd Liar-type sayings such as, ‘‘What I’m now saying is
not true’’ because what Moore said might be true: you may consis-
tently imagine a situation in which Moore went to the pictures last
Tuesday but fails to believe that he did. On the other hand it does
seem absurd to assert a proposition while, with no apparent change
of mind, or aside to a diﬀerent audience, going on to deny that one
believes it. Why should it be absurd of me to say something about
myself that might be true of me? Moore suggested an answer to this,
but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly impressed
by Moore’s discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions
because he saw that it illuminates ‘‘the logic of assertion’’.
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Wittgenstein suggests a promising relation of assertion to belief in
terms of the idea that one ‘‘expresses belief ’’ that is consistent with
the spirit of Moore’s failed attempt to explain the absurdity. Witt-
genstein also observes that ‘‘under unusual circumstances’’, the sen-
tence, ‘‘It’s raining but I don’t believe it’’ could be given ‘‘a clear
sense’’. Why does the absurdity disappear from speech in such cases?
Wittgenstein further suggests that analogous absurdity may be found
in terms of desire, rather than belief.
In what follows I develop an account of Moorean absurdity that,
with the exception of Wittgenstein’s last suggestion, is broadly con-
sistent with both Moore’s approach and Wittgenstein’s. My strategy
for so doing is as follows.
In §2 I explain the problem in Moore’s terms. In §3 I examine the
failure of Moore’s suggestion for explaining the absurdity. In §4 I
sketchWittgenstein’s own response to it. In §5, I show that the work of
both Moore and Wittgenstein helps demonstrate the need for ﬁve
constraints on any satisfactory account of Moorean absurdity, one of
which is that it should explain why it would be absurd to believe that (I
went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did). In §6 I
examine a set of examples of putativelyMoorean absurdities in order to
deﬁne Moorean belief and in §7 I explain its absurdity. In §8 I explain
the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of the expression of belief
and show how this enables an account of assertion. In §9 I use this
account to explain the genuinedisappearanceof absurdity fromspeech.
In §10 I show how the appearance of the absurdity in speech is some-
times an illusion. Finally I show in §11 that contrary to Wittgenstein’s
suggestion, there is no analogous absurdity in terms of desire.
2. THE PROBLEM OF MOORE’S ABSURDITIES
Moore did not only observe that to use the sentence
‘‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’’
assertively would be ‘‘absurd’’ (1942, 543). He also makes the same
point for
‘‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’’ (1944, 204).
Moore points out that no absurdity arises if I make such assertions
in the third person or past tense as, ‘‘Williams does not think it is
raining, yet as a matter of fact it is,’’ or ‘‘I thought it was not raining,
but as a matter of fact it was’’.
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Moore is careful to distinguish absurdity from paradox. What is
absurd is for me to assert such sentences. What is paradoxical is that
this absurdity persists in the absence of semantic contradiction in my
words themselves (Baldwin 1993, 209) for what I say about myself
might be true. So a natural way of resolving the paradox is to explain
the source of the absurdity, but not in wholly semantic terms. Doing
so would locate a contradiction-like phenomenon while recognising
that no contradiction lies in the meaning of what I have asserted.
That no contradiction lies in my words is shown by the fact that if I
deny them by saying, ‘‘If I went to the pictures last Tuesday then I
believe I did’’ or ‘‘If he has not gone out then I believe he has not
gone out’’ then I do not report a necessary truth about myself.1
3. MOORE’S ACCOUNT OF THE ABSURDITIES
Moore did not think he had a complete explanation of the absurdity
(Baldwin 1993, 211). Nonetheless he held that in making a ﬁrst-per-
son present-tense indicative assertion I ‘‘imply’’, in an everyday or
‘‘non-mysterious’’ sense (1944, 542), that I believe it. Thus Moore’s
ﬁrst principle is that
If I assert that p then I imply that I believe that p.
So when I assert that (p & I don’t believe that p) I assert that p. So I
imply that I believe that p, which ﬂatly contradicts the second con-
junct of my assertion. So what I assert ﬂatly contradicts what I imply
by asserting it (Baldwin, 1993, 210). We should note that Moore also
assumes that assertion distributes over conjunction:
If I assert that (p & q) then I assert that p and I assert that q.
This seems unobjectionable however. Surely in telling you that today
is hot and humid, I both tell you that today is hot and tell you that
today is humid.2
Moore’s ﬁrst example, ‘‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I
don’t believe that I did’’ has the omissive form p & I don’t believe that
p, so-called because it self-reports a speciﬁc lack of true belief. By
contrast, his second example, ‘‘I believe that he has gone out, but he
has not’’ has the commissive3 form p & I believe that not-p, so-called
because it self-reports my speciﬁc mistake in belief. This semantic
diﬀerence is inherited from the genuine diﬀerence between atheists
and agnostics.4 This diﬀerence is partly obscured by the fact that if
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you ask me ‘‘Is it raining?’’ and I truthfully reply ‘‘I don’t believe so’’,
you are usually justiﬁed in taking me to believe that it’s not raining,
unless I then qualify my self-report with ‘‘but then I’ve no beliefs
about it either way’’.
Moore himself probably did not see this diﬀerence. For he deals
with the commissive example by using a second principle that
If I assert that p then I imply that I don’t believe that not-p.
Since assertion distributes over conjunction, if I assert that (p & I
believe that not-p) then I assert that p. So I imply that I don’t believe
that not-p, which ﬂatly contradicts the second conjunct of my
assertion. So again, what I assert ﬂatly contradicts what I imply by
asserting it. But this proposal fails to explain the omissive assertion.
For on the second principle, if I assert that (p & I don’t believe that p)
then I imply-and-assert that I neither believe that not-p nor believe
that p, which is neither a ﬂat self-contradiction nor a contradiction in
belief, but rather a possible state of sensible agnosticism.
To repair this problem Moore could either apply the ﬁrst principle
to the commissive case as well or apply the ﬁrst principle to the
omissive case and the second to the commissive case. On the ﬁrst
option, I assert that p and so I imply that I believe that p. But this
does not ﬂatly contradict my assertion that I believe that not-p. In-
stead I have implied-and-asserted that I have a pair of contradictory
beliefs about whether or not p. So the two absurdities are concep-
tually distinct. On the second option, I have implied-and-asserted a
ﬂat contradiction in either case (that I do and don’t believe that p, in
the omissive case and that I do and don’t believe that not-p, in the
commissive case), so now the absurdity comes out as conceptually
identical. This means choosing between economy of explanandum and
economy of explanans. The ﬁrst option is best because as we just saw,
the omissive self-report of speciﬁc ignorance is semantically distinct
from the commissive self-report of speciﬁc mistake. So one might
expect a semantic diﬀerence in the contradiction-like phenomena that
constitutes the resulting absurdity.
But this account still faces the problem of elucidating the required
‘‘non-mysterious’’ sense of ‘‘imply’’. Moore claims (1942, 542–543)
that his ﬁrst principle,
arises from the fact, which we all learn by experience, that in the immense majority of
cases a man who makes such an assertion does believe or know what he asserts:
lying, although common enough, is vastly exceptional.
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This statistical claim is plausibly true. But as Baldwin points out,
(1990, 228) this ‘‘suggests that the absurdity . . . is comparable to
that of a report of a ﬂying pig, and also that in the mouth of a
known habitual liar paradoxical sentences should not sound at all
absurd’’.
We may appreciate the ﬁrst diﬃculty by noting that in the im-
mense majority of cases in which words pass through lips, the
source of those words is an inhabitant of the planet Earth. So in
this sense of ‘‘imply’’, the passing of words through lips, for
example, ‘‘The planet Earth is worth saving’’ implies that their
producer is an Earthling. But although it would be surprising to
hear someone add, ‘‘although I’m not an Earthling’’, such an
utterance is not absurd in the same way as Moore’s examples, be-
cause it betrays no failure of rationality. By contrast, my original
omissive or commissive speech act of assertion seems to constitute
grounds for criticism of my rationality, as opposed to the mere
truth of what I have asserted.
The second diﬃculty lies in the fact that if you learn that I’m lying
to you when I make omissive or commissive Moorean assertions, this
knowledge does nothing to expunge the absurdity. Nor will any other
context of communication expunge it (as Rosenthal notes in 1995,
203). For example, your knowledge that I’m reminding you, misin-
forming you, confessing to you or announcing to you, does nothing
to expunge it either. So insincere Moorean assertions, notably Mo-
orean lies, will have to be explained as well. This second diﬃculty is
compounded by Moore’s suggestion (1944, 210–211) that
a person’s saying certain words assertively tends to make his hearer believe that he
does believe the proposition expressed . . . and I think this may be all that’s meant by
saying his saying so-and-so implies that he believes that so-and-so.
Given this, my assertion to you that the pubs are open will tend to
make you believe that they are. But if you persist in disagreeing and I
say ‘‘You won’t tend to believe what I am going to say (I know) but I
tell you the pubs damn well are open!’’ then I have not contradicted
myself. Indeed all of what I’ve said might be true. But if it is true and
I add, ‘‘but in fact I don’t believe they are’’, or ‘‘but in fact I believe
they aren’t’’, then Moorean absurdity appears in a way that cannot
be explained by Moore’s own account.
I now examine how Wittgenstein developed his views on the topic
in response to Moore. This will help in formulating further con-
straints on any satisfactory account of Moorean absurdity.
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4. WITTGENSTEIN’S RESPONSE TO MOOREAN ABSURDITY
Malcolm reports Wittgenstein as having ‘‘once remarked that the
only work of Moore’s that greatly impressed him was his discovery of
the peculiar kind of nonsense involved in such a sentence as ‘It’s
raining but I don’t believe it’ ’’ (1984, 56).
In his letter to Moore the day after Moore’s paper to the Moral
Sciences Club Wittgenstein notes the importance of Moore’s discov-
ery of an absurdity ‘‘which is in fact similar to a contradiction, though
it isn’t one’’ and adds that Moore has ‘‘said something about the logic
of assertion’’ (1974, 177). So Wittgenstein agrees with Moore that his
examples are not semantic self-contradictions but sees that Moorean
assertion nonetheless involves a contradiction in some other way.
Wittgenstein’s point is that a satisfactory explanation of where the
contradiction is located will involve an analysis of assertion, in other
words its ‘‘logic’’. Wittgenstein also points out (1974, 177) that
It makes sense to say ‘‘Let’s suppose: p is the case and I don’t believe that p is the
case’’ whereas it makes no sense to assert ‘‘|-p is the case and I don’t believe that p is
the case’’.
Although Wittgenstein probably did not see the diﬀerence between
the omissive and commissive forms any more clearly than Moore, his
insight is that no absurdity arises if instead of asserting one of
Moore’s propositions, I verbally conjecture that it is true. This gives
verbal supposition a role in identifying the absurdity.
In the Investigations Wittgenstein coins the singular term
‘‘Moore’s paradox’’ which he formulates (1953, 190) in terms of
supposition rather than in Moore’s terms of an absurd assertion of a
possible truth:
‘‘I believe that this is the case’’ is used like the assertion ‘‘This is the case’’; and yet the
hypothesis that I believe that this is the case is not used like the hypothesis that this is
the case.
Since Wittgenstein identiﬁes use with speaker-meaning, his claim is
two-fold: that my assertion or self-report that I believe that p is, or
involves, my assertion that p, but my verbal supposition that I believe
that p (for the sake of argument) bears no relation to my verbal
supposition that p (for the sake of argument).5
Let us set aside the ﬁrst claim for the next two paragraphs. It is
now a small step to consider Wittgenstein’s remark in the context of
non-verbal supposition, as a mental act of supposing something true
as a means of deduction. We would all agree that, in this sense,
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I might suppose that Britney Spears is now President of the USA
without believing that she is. Moreover, no failure of rationality
arises if I suppose that Moore’s omissive or commissive examples are
true of me, as opposed to believing this. In other words, no irratio-
nality need infect me if I suppose speciﬁc instances of my ignorance
or mistaken belief to exist in order to deduce their consequences.
Thus Wittgenstein points out that no absurdity arises when Mo-
orean propositions are verbally or mentally supposed either as the
antecedent or the consequent of conditionals, as in, ‘‘If I never hold
any true beliefs then I always fail to recognise any fact’’ (Baldwin
1993, 207). But clearly I would be no less absurd if I believe one of
Moore’s propositions to be true without asserting it. By contrast, I
can quite sensibly suppose that I hold such beliefs. Indeed unlike
belief, I can sensibly suppose anything at all, even that I am sup-
posing nothing now. For unlike rational beliefs, useful suppositions
need not track the truth.
Consistently with this last point, Shoemaker (1995, fn 1, 227),
observes that ‘‘What can be coherently believed constrains what can
be coherently asserted but not conversely’’.6 But since ‘‘coherently’’ is
ambiguous between ‘‘consistently’’, ‘‘appropriately’’ and ‘‘rationally’’
then the principle best stick with Moore’s own term ‘‘absurdly’’, by
which he seems to mean, ‘‘irrationally, either in theory or practice’’.
This yields:
If I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I cannot non-absurdly
assert that p, but not conversely.
The failure of the converse is supported by the fact that my assertion,
‘‘I’m asserting nothing now’’, is unlike Moore’s example. For al-
though this would be an absurd thing to assert, I could quietly believe
in my continuing obedience to a Trappist vow of silence without the
least absurdity. By contrast, it would still be absurd of me to silently
believe either of Moore’s examples.7 Given Shoemaker’s constraint it
seems sensible to ﬁrst give an account of the account of the absurdity
of Moorean belief and then account for the absurdity of Moorean
assertion. For if the explanation of the absurdity of Moorean asser-
tion can be delivered, at minimal explanatory extra cost, in terms of
the absurdity of Moorean belief, then one seems to get both expla-
nations with best economy.
In the ﬁrst volume of his Remarks on the Foundations of Psy-
chology (1980a, §490), Wittgenstein elaborates on his formulation of
the paradox:
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The paradox is this: the supposition may be expressed as follows: ‘‘Suppose this went
on inside me and that outside’’ – but the assertion that this is going on inside me
asserts this is going on outside me. As suppositions the two propositions about the
inside and the outside are quite independent, but not as assertions.
Here Wittgenstein more clearly claims that
If I assert that I believe that p then I assert that p.
Wittgenstein holds that both my self-report of belief, ‘‘I believe
that p’’ and my plain assertion, ‘‘p’’ have roughly similar uses and so,
for Wittgenstein, roughly similar meanings. Thus Wittgenstein adds,
One might also put it like this: ‘‘I believe p’’ means roughly the same
as ‘‘p’’’ (1980a, §472). His point is that both tell a hearer something
about my own attitude to the outside world as well as something
about the world itself (as I take it to be). Moreover, to decide whether
I believe that p all I normally have to do is to look to the outside
world and decide whether p (1980a, §488, §501).
On this view of it, the absurdity of Moorean assertion lies in the
fact that my assertion that I believe that p at least involves my
assertion that p. So this strategy of getting an absurdity out of my
assertion or self-report that I believe that p is quite diﬀerent from
Moore’s, which was to get the absurdity out of my assertion that p.
Wittgenstein’s strategy succeeds in explaining the absurdity of the
commissive Moorean assertion, for in asserting that (p & I believe
that not-p) I assert that I believe that not-p and so assert that not-p,
which contradicts my assertion that p. So although what I have as-
serted is not a self-contradiction, nonetheless my assertion of it in-
volves contradictory assertions.
Contemporary followers of Wittgenstein, notably Heal (1994) have
defended this account, but as I have argued elsewhere (Williams 1998,
§§3–6), there are serious diﬃculties in it. Firstly the principle that by
asserting, ‘‘I believe that not-p’’, I assert that not-p, is challenged by
my act of saying, ‘‘I think the pub’s not closed, but I wouldn’t like to
say so, so don’t quote me’’. In support of the principle, Heal points out
that by saying sincerely ‘‘I believe that not-p’’, I express my belief that
not-p. Given Heal’s assumption that in expressing a belief, I assert
what I express, it follows that by saying sincerely ‘‘I believe that not-
p’’, I assert that not-p. But Heal’s assumption is challenged by cases in
which beliefs are expressed by conversational implicature. By
answering your question, ‘‘Where do her parents live?’’ with ‘‘Some-
where in Thailand’’, I express my belief that I cannot be more infor-
mative than I have been without going beyond what I am in a position
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to assert. But I do not seem to have asserted this.Moreover it is unclear
how Heal’s account could deal with insincere Moorean assertions.
But the decisive objection is that the account cannot explain the
absurdity of the omissiveMoorean assertion. For in asserting that (p &
I don’t believe that p) I assert a lack of belief, to which the just-disputed
principle cannot apply. We might attempt to repair this problem by
supplementing the account with a second principle that if I assert that I
don’t believe that p then I deny that p. But then on that principle, an
agnostic who truthfully reports, ‘‘I neither believe that God exists nor
believe that he doesn’t’’ would be making contradictory assertions
about the existence of God. Plainly he isn’t. Likewise, my admission of
ignorance of your innocence is not an accusation of your guilt.
However elsewhere (1980a, §472) Wittgenstein suggests a more
promising relation of assertion to belief:
I want to say ﬁrst of all with the assertion ‘‘it’s going to rain’’ one expresses belief in
that just as one expresses the wish to have wine with the words ‘‘Wine over here!’’
This is plausibly read as the claim that
If I assert that p then I ostensibly express my belief that p.
Since assertion distributes over conjunction, in asserting that (p &
I don’t believe that p), I assert that p and so ostensibly express my
belief that p. But I also assert that I don’t believe that p. So I assert-
and-ostensibly-express a belief and the lack of it. In other words, I
assert-and-ostensibly-express a self-contradiction. By contrast, in
asserting that (p & I believe that not-p), I assert-and-ostensibly-ex-
press contradictory beliefs about whether p. However the term
‘‘express’’ will need elucidation, a task I will postpone until §8.
Wittgenstein also observes that ‘‘under unusual circumstances’’,
the sentence, ‘‘It’s raining but I don’t believe it’ could be given a clear
sense’’ (1980b, §290). Indeed he gives two consecutive examples of
non-absurd uses of omissive sentences. The ﬁrst is when delighted by
the imminent arrival of a friend, I exclaim in amazement, ‘‘He’s
coming but I still can’t believe it’’ (1980a, §485). The second is of a
railway announcer who is convinced that the train won’t arrive. Under
orders, he announces its arrival and adds, ‘‘Personally I don’t believe
it’’ (1980a, §§ 486–487). Wittgenstein then gives an example of a non-
absurd use of a commissive sentence, that of a soldier who produces
military communique´s but adds that he believes they are incorrect.
Wittgenstein’s point is that the appearance of the absurdity in
speech is not guaranteed by a mere utterance of a sentence of Moore’s
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omissive or commissive forms, as opposed to its assertion. This is an
important point to bear in mind and is one that is entirely consistent
with the spirit of Moore’s own writings.
Wittgenstein also supplements Moore’s point that ﬁrst-person
present-tense conjugations play a crucial role in Moorean assertions.
For Wittgenstein claims (1953, 190) that if there were a verb meaning,
‘‘to believe falsely’’ then it would not have any signiﬁcant ﬁrst-person
present indicative. His point is that ﬁrst-person present-tense asser-
tions such as, ‘‘I now mistakenly believe that it’s raining’’ are not
‘‘signiﬁcant’’, in the sense that they do not have a semantic content
that can be communicated or successfully voiced.
Wittgenstein adds (1953, 190) that it is a most remarkable thing,
that the verbs ‘‘believe’’, ‘‘wish’’, ‘‘will’’ display all the inﬂexions
possessed by ‘‘cut’’, ‘‘chew’’, ‘‘run’’’, thus suggesting analogous
absurdity may be found in terms of desire, rather than belief.
5. FIVE CONSTRAINTS ON ANY SATISFACTORY ACCOUNT
OF MOOREAN ABSURDITY
We have seen that any satisfactory account of Moorean absurdity
must
(1) identify a contradiction, or something contradiction-like, but not
with the Moorean proposition itself
(2) make this identiﬁcation for both Moorean assertion and Moo-
rean belief (in a way that recognises that if I cannot non-absurdly
believe that p then I cannot non-absurdly assert that p, but not
conversely)
(3) be equally plausible for omissive and commissive forms of the
paradox
and
(4) explain the role of circumstances which result in the disappear-
ance of the absurdity from speech.
As we just saw, we are indebted to Moore himself for specifying the
ﬁrst condition, to Wittgenstein for suggesting a way to the second, to
Moore for his unwitting choice of examples as a way of recognising
the third (now supplemented by Shoemaker) and to Wittgenstein for
clearly pointing out the fourth. The third constraint, of which most
early commentators (including Moore himself) run afoul, is now
more generally recognised. Nonetheless it is still common to ﬁnd
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accounts of the absurdity in which authors have the omissive cases in
mind that fail to account for commissive cases or visa versa.8
However there is a ﬁfth constraint to be added. For there is a class
of assertions that intuitively share the paradigmatic absurdity of
Moore’s examples. These include the non-conjunctive, ‘‘I have no
beliefs now’’, ‘‘Although you think all my opinions mistaken, you are
always right’’ as well as the non-ﬁrst person ‘‘God knows that we are
not theists’’ and the commissive ‘‘God knows that I am an atheist’’
(see Sorensen 1988, Chapter 1). On the other hand there is a class of
absurd assertions that are clearly not Moorean, such as ‘‘It’s raining
and not raining’’, ‘‘I am asserting nothing now’’ and ‘‘It’s raining but I
believe that it is raining without the least justiﬁcation’’ (compare Adler
1999 267–268). In the middle is a third class of borderline candidates
for the essential absurdity such as, ‘‘All my present beliefs are mis-
taken’’. So a satisfactory account of Moorean absurdity should also
(5) provide a way of identifying further examples of Moorean
absurdity.
6. DEFINING MOOREAN BELIEFS IN THE LIGHT OF EXAMPLES.
An obvious strategy for satisfying this last constraint is to compare
and contrast putatively Moorean beliefs with beliefs in Moore’s own
two examples. Since the ﬁrst constraint prohibits any Moorean belief
in a self-contradiction or necessary falsehood, it is easy to see that
although my belief that it is both raining and not raining would be
absurd, it would not be absurd in the same way as a belief in Moore’s
examples. It would be irrational of me to hold such a belief because I
should be able to see, with a minimum of reﬂection upon syntax or
semantics, that what I believe cannot be true. By contrast, since
Moore’s examples report my speciﬁc ignorance or mistaken belief,
they report no irrationality on my part, since my non-omniscience or
fallibility is not itself irrational. But other cases are not so easily
discernible as non-Moorean. Take my belief that
All my present beliefs are mistaken.
This can be read in two ways. If we read it as
All my present beliefs (excluding this) are mistaken
then this might be true of me, but then I am not irrational if I believe
or assert it. For it might report the fact that I have just learned that I
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am the victim of systematic delusion. Such knowledge might well
improve my rationality. So on this reading it is not Moorean. On the
other hand if we read it as
All my present beliefs (including this) are mistaken
then it is not a possible truth. For if it is true then my belief of it is
mistaken, so it is false. So on no reading is it Moorean.
Since the mere truth of Moore’s examples constitutes no irratio-
nality in me, his examples also diﬀer from my belief that I hold a self-
contradictory belief. For the same reason, my belief that
It’s raining but I believe that it is raining without the least justi-
ﬁcation
is not a Moorean belief. By contrast, my belief that
I have no beliefs now
intuitively shares the paradigmatic absurdity, despite the fact that it is
not a belief in a conjunction. Whereas Moore’s examples report spe-
ciﬁc instances of my ignorance or mistaken belief, the content of this
belief reports my present state of universal ignorance. The existence of
such a state does not impugn my rationality. But in so reporting it, it
also reports my speciﬁc ignorance of the truth of that very content, if
the moment of reporting is the moment at which I assert or believe it.
This explains why quantifying more generally over all moments, as in
I never hold any true beliefs
would likewise be absurd of me to believe or assert.
So what is essential to the absurdity of someone believing or
asserting a Moorean proposition is that such an assertion transpar-
ently self-reports that person’s speciﬁc present instance of ignorance or
mistaken belief. This explains why
It is raining but Williams does not believe it is
is non-Moorean, since it does not transparently self-report a speciﬁc
instance of my ignorance. For it is not absurd of me to believe it if I
know or even mistakenly believe that in fact I am not Williams. Nor
will you ﬁnd it an absurd thing for me to assert to you if you know
that I know or mistakenly believe that I’m not Williams. Nor does it
seem absurd in the same way as Moore’s examples for me to believe
that
It’s raining but my father’s only son does not believe it
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even if I am my father’s only son. For this is not an irrational thing
for me to believe if I know or mistakenly believe that I am my father’s
daughter. A further failing of self-reporting occurs when I am so drunk
that I fail to realise that the person I am looking at in the mirror is me
because Imistakenly believe I am looking through awindow.Were I to
tell you that the person in the glass mistakenly believes that it is raining
then I would become credible to you in virtue of your knowledge that
I foolishly fail to know myself under my reﬂected guise.
Likewise, as Moore pointed out, no absurdity arises for past tense
versions of his examples such as
Yesterday I failed to correctly believe the fact that it was raining.
Nor it is found in future tense versions such as
Tomorrow I will mistakenly believe that Big Brother is not a
ﬁction
which might sensibly predict the result of my appointment to be
brainwashed at the Ministry of Love. A disguised self-report of a
speciﬁc present instance of ignorance ormistaken belief is also found in
God knows that we are not theists
despite not being conjugated in the present tense, because the personal
pronoun, ‘‘we’’ includes a self-report. For in asserting or believing
either, I still believe or assert something about myself as well.
Our examination of the examples so far suggests the following
incomplete deﬁnition:
MP¢) Any belief is Moorean just in case the content of that belief
is a possible truth that self-reports no irrationality but the
belief in it is irrational (in the same way asMoore’s examples)
Of course the deﬁnition is incomplete since we still must now
account for the speciﬁc way in which it is irrational to believe
Moore’s examples.
7. THE ABSURDITY OF MOOREAN BELIEF
Neither Moore nor Wittgenstein explicitly consider the absurdity as it
arises in belief as opposed to assertion.Nonetheless an account of it can
be given that is broadly consistent with both Moore andWittgenstein.
All commentators who explain the absurdity of Moorean belief
(for example Heal 1994, 21–2) appeal to the principle that belief
distributes over conjunction:
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If I believe that (p & q) then I believe that p and I believe that q.
Moreover it is hard to see how the absurdity of Moorean belief could
be explained without it. Although an appeal to doxastic principles in
explaining the absurdity of Moorean belief should be generally re-
garded with suspicion, this principle is an exception. For unlike BB-
type principles for example, it seems to follow from the very concept
of belief. If I fail to believe that today is hot or fail to believe that
today is humid, surely I cannot hold the belief that today is hot and
humid. Since the principle is a deﬁnitional truth, appealing to it
prejudges no question of rationality.
Now consider Moore’s omissive example. If I believe that (p & I
don’t believe that p), then since belief distributes over conjunction, I
believe that p. But then what I believe is false, since its second conjunct
is false. Although my belief is not a belief in a necessary falsehood it is
self-falsifying. Although what I believe might be might be true of me
and although I might believe it, it cannot be true of me if I believe it. In
other words, it is logically impossible for me to truly believe it. By
contrast I can truly believe Moore’s commissive example. For if I be-
lieve that (p & I believe that not-p) then since belief distributes over
conjunction, again I believe that p, which is consistent with the second
conjunct of what I believe, but only if I hold contradictory beliefs about
whether p.
Moreover, discerning this fact, as we just saw, requires a minimum
of reﬂection.9 So it is not diﬃcult to see that I am severely irrational
in the way I theorise and thus why my belief is absurd.
In believing Moore’s omissive proposition I have a self-falsifying
belief. In believing Moore’s comissive proposition, I escape this
irrationality only by the irrationality of holding contradictory beliefs.
Thus both beliefs are equally absurd because these two failures of
theoretical rationality are equally severe. For both types of belief are
equally useless as guides to the truth. Any evidence that (absurdly)
justiﬁes me in believing the omissive proposition would justify me in
believing what is then false. Likewise any evidence for my belief that
p is ipso facto evidence against my belief that not-p and conversely.
Nonetheless the two irrationalities are distinct, as we should expect
from the clear diﬀerence between an instance of ignorance and an
instance of mistaken belief.
The absurdity of otherMoorean beliefs can be explained in the same
way. With one exception, all these beliefs are self-falsifying. For
example, if I now believe that I have no beliefs now, then my belief is
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true only if it is false. Since my belief is non-conjunctive, no appeal is
needed to the principle that belief distributes over conjunction. Like-
wise, suppose that I believe that although you think all my opinions
mistaken, you are always right. If my belief is true then you would be
right to now think that it is mistaken, so it is false. Finally, suppose that
I believe thatGodknows that I amnot a theist. To explain the absurdity
of my belief we must acknowledge the facticity of knowledge:
If I know that p then p
If my belief is true then since God’s knowledge is factive, I do not
believe that God exists. But in believing that God knows that I am
not a theist, I believe that God exists. So my belief cannot be true.
To see the comissive exception, suppose that I believe that God
knows that I am an atheist. If my belief is true then since God’s
knowledge is factive, I believe that God does not exist. But in
believing that God knows that I am an atheist, I believe that God
exists. So my belief escapes self-falsiﬁcation only if I hold contra-
dictory beliefs about whether God exists. Since I am in position to
work this out with a little reﬂection (as we just did) I would be
theoretically irrational in continuing to hold such beliefs.
Now we know the exact way in which it is irrational to believe
Moore’s examples, we may say that
MP) Any belief is Moorean just in case the content of that belief is
a possible truth that self-reports no irrationality but the
belief in it is self-falsifying on pain of contradictory beliefs.
One virtue of this deﬁnition is that it allows that there is nothing
absurd in my belief that
At least one of my present beliefs is mistaken
because this content fails to self-report a speciﬁc instance of mistaken
belief. Asserting or believing it would be a perfectly reasonable dis-
claimer of my infallibility that is has most probably been long true of
me (See De Almeida 2001, §4). Thus no deep contradiction-like ﬂaw
in me is revealed.
Of course, my belief in my own disclaimer guarantees that I have
at least one false belief. For by reductio ad absurdum, if my belief that
I have at least one mistaken belief is false then none of my beliefs are
mistaken, including my belief in this disclaimer. On the one hand this
means I have inconsistent beliefs, namely a set of beliefs that cannot
all be true. But on the other hand, it also means that my belief in my
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own mistakenness is infallible. Since I was most likely mistaken in
some of my many beliefs anyway, such a tight grasp of the truth that I
am indeed mistaken represents a useful motive for ﬁnding out the
truth about which speciﬁc mistaken beliefs I hold by looking again at
the quality of evidence.
The lesson to be drawn from this is that Moorean absurdity is not
to be analysed in terms of inconsistent beliefs but rather in terms of
contradictory beliefs. For self-contradictory or contradictory beliefs
are inconsistent but not conversely. Inconsistency in my beliefs does
not necessarily undermine my justiﬁcation in the way my self-con-
tradictory or contradictory beliefs do. Any evidence for my belief that
p is ipso facto evidence against my belief that not-p and conversely.
Thus any evidence for the truth of my self-contradictory belief that (p
& not-p) is evidence for its falsehood. By contrast, evidence for my
belief in my occasional mistakenness need not count against any of
my other beliefs, nor visa versa. I would now have inconsistent beliefs,
but not contradictory ones. My correct belief in my occasional
mistakenness does not entail beliefs that contradict each other, since
we may consistently suppose that I don’t believe that all of my beliefs
are true. So unlike a Moorean belief, one that is self-falsifying on pain
of contradictory beliefs, my belief that some of my beliefs are mis-
taken is not Moorean, for by contrast, such commitment to the
necessity of at least one false belief is benign.10
8. THE ABSURDITY OF MOOREAN ASSERTION
Suppose that we elucidate Moore’s ‘‘non-mysterious’’ sense of
‘‘imply’’ as ‘‘ostensibly express’’. Then Moore’s ﬁrst principle that
If I assert that p then I imply a belief that p
becomes Wittgenstein’s more promising principle that
If I assert that p to you then I ostensibly express belief that p to
you.
This move is consistent with the following passage from Moore
(1912, 125):
The truth is that there is an important distinction, which is not always observed,
between what a manmeans by a given assertion and what he expresses by it. Whenever
we make any assertion whatever (unless we do not mean what we say), we are always
expressing one or of two things–namely, either that we think the thing in question to be
so or that we know it to be so.
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Let us elucidate ‘‘express’’ as both factive and intentional. It is factive
in the sense that I express N only if I have N, where N is a noun
phrase such as ‘‘belief’’, ‘‘interest’’ or ‘‘indiﬀerence’’. This usage is of
‘‘express’’ is true to its Latin root, ‘‘press out’’, for a woman cannot
express milk from her breast unless she has it. Moreover it conforms
to Moore’s usage above. So if I express a belief that p to you that p
then I have the belief that p. By contrast I ostensibly express N to you
just in case I represent myself to you as expressing my N to you, as
when insincerely express interest in seeing your holiday snapshots
again for the umpteenth time by telling you that I’d love to see them.
Let us also use ‘‘express’’ as containing a relevant intention,
according to which muttering ‘‘Bush is mad’’ in my sleep does not
express my belief that Bush is mad, but merely manifests that belief. I
manifest N just in case I behave in a way that aﬀords you reason to
think I have N. By contrast, I express N just in case I behave in a way
that oﬀers you reason to think that I have N, in other words,
intentionally aﬀords you that reason. Where N is a belief this gives us
a deﬁnition of expression of belief:
I express my belief that p to you just in case I believe that p and I
behave in a way that intentionally oﬀers you reason to think that I
believe that p
as well as a deﬁnition of ostensible expression of belief:
I ostensibly express my belief that p to you just in case I behave in a
way that intentionally oﬀers you reason to think that I believe that p
As we should expect, all expressions of beliefs are ostensible expres-
sions of belief but not conversely. We may now give a deﬁnition of
assertion in terms of expression of belief:
I assert that p to you just in case I ostensibly express my belief that p
to you with the intention of changing your mind in a relevant way.11
The reference to ostensible expression accommodates lies, which are
surely genuine assertions. In lying to you that the pubs are still open I
oﬀer you a reason to think that they are still open. The change of mind
I intend to bring about is to make you mistakenly believe that the pubs
are still open. The change is relevant in the sense that the proposition I
assert forms the core of the description of that change. Likewise in
letting you know that it is raining I oﬀer you reason to think that it is
raining by expressing genuine sincerity. The change of mind I aim for
in this case is to impart to you my knowledge that it is raining.
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This account of assertion also has the advantage of accommo-
dating non-verbal assertions. Carrying an umbrella only counts as a
manifestation of my belief that it will rain, since it only aﬀords you
reason to think that hold that belief. By contrast, shaking it deﬁantly
in your face when you scoﬀ at my forecast of rain counts as my
assertion that it will rain, since I have deliberately oﬀered you a
reason to think that it will rain (namely that I think so myself) with
the intention of changing your opinion about the weather.
This means that there can be non-verbal Moorean assertions as
well, as when you ask me if the pubs are still open and I nod my head
in emphatic agreement while saying, ‘‘I don’t believe so’’. Perhaps
Moore has such a case in mind in explicitly distinguishing between
the uttering of words assertively and making an assertion (Baldwin
1993, 207).
In what sense do I oﬀer you reason to think that I believe that p
in asserting to you that p? A liar attempts to represent himself as a
sincere truth-teller. But if lying were known to be the universal
norm then this attempt would always fail with the result that the
practice of lying could never succeed. A speech act not governed by
the norm that the speaker believe its content to be true, would not
be the speech act of assertion (compare Williamson 1996). Thus if
you are to make sense of my speech acts then the rational thing for
you to do is to assume that I am sincere unless observation sug-
gests otherwise. Thus my speech act of assertion that p gives you
prima facie reason to think me sincere. This is broadly consistent
with Moore’s failed attempt to elucidate ‘‘imply’’. What immedi-
ately follows from the account is the principle that my assertion
ostensibly expresses my belief in it:
If I assert that p to you then I ostensibly express my belief that p to
you.12
Having granted the sincerity of my assertion, you now have some
defeasible reason to grant its truth. For granting that I’m sincere in
what I tell you grants me the minimal authority I need for you to
accept my testimony. Admittedly, there are cases in which I make the
honest mistake of sincerely telling a falsehood. There are also cases in
which I insincerely tell the truth by presenting my lucky guess as an
assertion or by getting my facts backwards in an attempt to lie. But
given that you are not in a position to suspect that this is one of these
rare cases, my assertion that p also gives you prima facie reason to
believe my words by giving you prima facie reason to believe me
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sincere. This account also vindicates Moore’s second principle when
‘‘imply’’ is read as ‘‘ostensibly express’’, namely that an assertion
ostensibly expresses lack of belief in its falsehood:
If I assert that p to you then I ostensibly express my lack of belief
that not-p to you.
For if you are to make sense of my speech acts then you must
charitably assume that I do not hold contradictory beliefs about
whether p. So once you have granted the sincerity of my assertion
that p you must also grant that don’t believe in the falsehood of my
own words, in other words that I’m innocent of a stronger form of
insincerity, namely lying.
Some who write about expression (see Green, Chapter 2) might
object that it is impossible to express a lack of anything, perhaps
because of the facticity of expression. If I can only express what I
really have, how can I express something that isn’t there? Surely a
woman couldn’t express a lack of milk from her breast. But we can
see that the facticity of expression is compatible with the possibility of
expressing a lack of N, once we notice that a lack of N, such as a lack
of conﬁdence, is something real that I can have within me. If you ask
me if I’m interested in going to a party and I shrug my shoulders, I
may express indiﬀerence to your proposal. My indiﬀerence is some-
thing real inside me, but an equivalent way of describing it is as my
lack of interest both in going and in not going to the party.
It now follows that that there is a more direct way for me to
express my belief that p to you, namely by asserting to you that I
believe that p. For making this assertion gives you a prima facie
reason to believe me sincere and so gives you a prima facie reason to
believe my words. Thus a third principle drops out of the account,
that my self-report of belief expresses that belief:
If I assert that I believe that p to you then I ostensibly express my
belief that p to you.
In accordance with the ﬁrst principle, in making such an assertion I
also ostensibly express my higher order belief that I believe that p as
well.13
A fourth principle that my account yields is that self-report of lack
of belief expresses my lack of belief:
If I assert that I don’t believe that p to you then I ostensibly
express my lack of belief that p to you.
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For making this assertion gives you prima facie reason to believe my
words.
We can now explain the absurdity of Moorean assertion. When I
make the omissive assertion to you that (p & I don’t believe that p)
then I assert that p (since assertion distributes over conjunction) and
so by the ﬁrst principle that my assertion ostensibly expresses my
belief in it, I ostensibly express a belief that p. But I also assert that I
lack that belief. So by the fourth principle that my self-report of lack
of belief ostensibly expresses my lack of belief, I ostensibly express
that lack of belief that p. So I ostensibly express a belief and the lack
of it. In other words, I ostensibly express a self-contradiction. You
have no reason to accept my assertion that p since I have told you
that I am insincere. Moreover, if you accept what I express then you
must think that I do and don’t believe that p.
When I make the commissive assertion to you that (p & I believe
that not-p) then I assert that p (since assertion distributes over con-
junction) and so by the ﬁrst principle, I ostensibly express a belief that
p. But I also assert that I believe that not-p. So by the third principle
that my self-report of belief expresses that belief, I ostensibly express
my belief that not-p. Thus I ostensibly express contradictory beliefs.
You have no reason to accept my assertion that p since I have told
you that I am lying. Moreover, if you accept what I express then you
must think that I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p.
In either case I am in a position to see that you will think that I’m
making a feeble joke rather than adopting contradictory beliefs or
ascribing contradictory beliefs to me. So I should realise that you will
not accept my assertion. So if I persist in my assertion I am practi-
cally irrational in the sense that I am trying to achieve something I
can see won’t succeed.
This account satisﬁes Shoemaker’s constraint because in either
case, what I express by making the assertion is identical to what is the
case if I truly believe my own assertion.
Moreover, the account can be easily extended to the other Mo-
orean assertions, namely those assertions the belief of which would
be Moorean. For example, if I now assert to you that I have no
beliefs now, then by the ﬁrst principle, I ostensibly express my belief
that I now have no beliefs. But by the fourth principle that my self-
report of lack of belief expresses my lack of belief, I ostensibly
express that total lack of belief. So I ostensibly express a belief and
the total lack of belief. So what I express is self-contradictory.
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Moreover it also accounts for the absurdity in non-assetoric
contexts such as, ‘‘What time is it? But I don’t want to know what
time it is’’.14 In asking a question under the right circumstances I
oﬀer you the prima facie reason to think that I want to know the
answer. Such circumstances exclude those in we both know that I
am checking the accuracy of your watch. So I express a desire to
know the time, the existence of which is contradicted by my second
remark. Likewise in issuing a command I express the desire that it
be executed by oﬀering you the prima facie reason to think that I
want it executed. Such circumstances exclude those in we both
know that I am reluctantly passing on an order from above. Thus in
saying, ‘‘Shut the door! But I don’t want you to shut it’’, I express a
desire that you shut the door, the existence of which is contradicted
by my second remark.
9. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE ABSURDITY FROM SPEECH
My account of assertion enables us to explain examples such as
Wittgenstein’s in which no absurdity appears in my uttering a
Moorean sentence to you. In each case the absurdity is expunged by
your background knowledge that I’m not attempting an assertion at
all. To see this, it is best to ﬁrst distinguish between successfully
making a bona ﬁde assertion and making a successful assertion. I fail
to make a bona ﬁde assertion if I utter, ‘‘The pubs are still open’’ but
am too drunk to articulate these words intelligibly. Nor do I succeed
in making a bona ﬁde assertion if I utter these words as an actor in a
play, since all I attempt is to depict the assertion of a ﬁctional guise.
Having successfully made a bona ﬁde assertion, that assertion may
succeed or fail depending upon its point, in other words what change
of mind I intend to bring about in you. In attempting to inform or let
you know that p, I intend to get you to know that p. When I lie to you
that p, I intend to get you to mistakenly believe that p.
One way in which I do not make a bona ﬁde assertion is when you
know that I am not speaking propria voce. My articulate utterance,
‘‘It’s raining but I don’t believe it’’ under the footlights may depict
the absurd assertion of my ﬁctional guise. But since we both know
that this is not my assertion, I oﬀer you no reason to think that I
believe what I say. Wittgenstein’s last two examples fall into the same
category, for our common knowledge that I’m parroting the words of
the announcement or communique´ means that I am not even
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attempting to make you think I believe them, since we both recognise
that quoting isn’t asserting either. Another such case arises when I
sarcastically repeat your claim that the pubs are closed and add, ‘‘I
don’t think!’’ No absurdity arises because we both know that I am
only quoting your assertion in order to deny it.
The absurdity may sometimes disappear even when I speak propria
voce. Obviously no absurdity arises if I utter a Moorean sentence to
you as a feeble joke or in order to test a microphone since it is clear to
you in either case that I am not attempting an assertion. Now con-
sider Wittgenstein’s ﬁrst example, in which I exclaim to you, ‘‘He’s
coming but I still can’t believe it’’. In order to avoid uncharitably
judging me irrational, you should not take the second part of my
exclamation as the literal truth, but rather as an expression of my
amazement occasioned by my recognition of a fact that merits yet
resists belief. Since we both know that I am not oﬀering you a reason
to think I lack the belief that he’s coming, I have only asserted the
ﬁrst half of my exclamation. But half an assertion isn’t an assertion.
Likewise, once we know that Luis Bun˜uel’s remark, ‘‘I’m still an
atheist, thank God’’ was made ironically as he was evicted from
Spain for attacking Christianity, then his parenthetical addition gives
us no reason to think he believes in God. We will take it as a con-
ventional expression of relief that his assertion is true rather than an
expression of gratitude to God. A ﬁnal case arises when you ask me
whether the capital of Thailand is Bangkok or Saigon. If I am a
contestant in your quiz in which success is understood to be the mere
utterance of the correct answer rather than the manifestation of
knowledge, no absurdity arises if I answer, ‘‘The capital of Thailand
is Bangkok’’ and then truthfully add, ‘‘but actually I have no beliefs
about this either way’’. My guess is not an assertion because it oﬀers
you no reason to think I believe it.
10. THE ILLUSION OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE ABSURDITY
IN SPEECH
There are circumstances in which the appearance of Moorean
absurdity in speech is itself an illusion. This is the lesson to be learned
from Crimmins’ example (1992, as discussed by Ha´jek and Stoljar
2001 and Rosenthal 2002).
Suppose the following. Superman informs me that I’m acquainted
with him when he is disguised as some other person, whom I think
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idiotic. However, he does not tell me who this other person is.
Moreover, I accept his words on the strength of his reliability and
intelligence. I now seem compelled to acknowledge my acceptance of
his news with the reply,
I mistakenly believe that you are an idiot.
A meta-paradox now surfaces. Since the logical form of my remark is
equivalent to that of Moore’s commissive example, it should be ab-
surd. But it does not appear to be so. Moreover, in apparent con-
tradiction of Wittgenstein, I seem to have used the ﬁrst-person
present indicative to make a non-self-defeating assertion.
But in fact the appearance of absurdity is an illusion that arises
from an easily made confusion between two readings of my remark,
only one of which is absurd. Since I am now attempting to address
Superman in order to report my mistaken belief about him, it is
natural to take my unguarded reply as my assertion that
I now mistakenly believe that you, Superman, are now an idiot.
Taken this way, the absurdity is more apparent. Moreover the
absurdity is genuine. For since it is semantically equivalent to
You, Superman, are not now an idiot but I now believe that you
are now an idiot
it would be absurd of me to believe it or to assert it to Superman as
explained above in §7 and §8. Indeed the absurdity of asserting it has
an additional source. Superman would not accept the sincerity of
such an assertion since he knows that I have just accepted his testi-
mony on the strength of his intelligence and so knows that I now
believe that he is not now an idiot. Moreover I cannot sensibly at-
tempt to make the assertion in order to inform him that my words are
true. That would involve attempting to impart to him my knowledge
that he is now an idiot. But I do not have this knowledge, since I
believe that he is not an idiot. Nor would my assertion fare any better
as a lie, since Superman himself knows that he is not now an idiot.
Nonetheless there must be some way in which I can sensibly
acknowledge my acceptance of Superman’s news. Finding the
appropriate way of doing so is problematic because Superman did
not let me know the identity of the person with whom I’m acquainted
and whom I think idiotic. Had he done so then I wouldn’t have this
problem. For example, had he informed me that his alter ego is Clark
Kent then I would have to stop believing that Clark is an idiot. For
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otherwise I would have to start believing that Superman is an idiot,
but we both know that’s not true. In that case I could simply inform
Superman that I have just changed my mind about Clark. But I can’t
do that in this case since I don’t know which idiot he has in mind.
This is because I don’t pick out that person by the description of
Superman’s normal guise, namely ‘‘the only person with the letter S
emblazoned on his leotard’’. Nonetheless let us suppose for the sake
of argument that his alter ego is one of a domain of several persons,15
for example, my colleagues at the Daily Planet, whom I can pick out
by some description, such as ‘‘the only mild mannered reporter who
wears spectacles’’.
This suggests that I could try addressing him under a domain, as in
‘‘I now believe that you, one of my colleagues at the Daily Planet, are
now an idiot’’. But that won’t work either, since I’m now trying to
address Superman, not one of those idiots. Nor could I address
Superman under the description of his disguise, such as ‘‘the only
mild mannered reporter who wears spectacles’’ since I don’t know
that this description picks out the person I’m addressing. However,
we saw in §6 that I may avoid making a Moorean assertion if I self-
report my speciﬁc instance of ignorance or mistaken belief as it arises
other than now. So I can sensibly acknowledge my acceptance of
Superman’s testimony by now replying,
I mistakenly believe that you are an idiot whenever I meet you
disguised as that colleague at the Daily Planet.
No absurdity appears because I am careful not to say that I now hold
a belief that is mistaken. Put this way, my reply is akin to ‘‘Some of
my beliefs are false’’, since either tells you that not all my beliefs are
always true. But as we noted in §7, this is not a Moorean assertion. I
escape the Moorean speciﬁcity of my self-report of mistaken belief
because I don’t know when my beliefs are mistaken, since I don’t
know when I’m acquainted with Superman’s alter ego.
Another way to put the solution is as follows. Superman’s news
makes me believe that there is some person that I cannot identify that
I believe (whenever I meet him or indeed think of him under the
description that I normally use to pick him out) to be an idiot. It also
makes me believe that this unidentiﬁed person is Superman. But this
does not make me believe that Superman is an idiot.
Since my unguarded reply, ‘‘I mistakenly believe that you are an
idiot’’ masquerades as the absurd, ‘‘I nowmistakenly believe that you,
Superman, are now an idiot’’ when it is really elliptical for the sensible,
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‘‘I mistakenly believe that you are an idiot whenever I meet you dis-
guised as that colleague at the Daily Planet’’, its apparent absurdity is
an illusion.16
11. THE ABSENCE OF ANALOGOUS ABSURDITY IN
TERMS OF DESIRE
We are now in a position to examine Wittgenstein’s suggestion that
an analogous absurdity may be found in terms of desire, rather than
belief. It turns out that there is no such analogue, but seeing why this
is so tells us something distinctive about desire. In the omissive case
the analogue would be exempliﬁed by
I’m drinking beer now but I don’t want to be drinking it now.
Unlike Moore’s examples this is not absurd to assert or believe. No
absurdity is found either in the comissive analogue
I’m drinking beer now but I want to be not drinking it now.
I could sincerely and truly report either of these facts when you force
me to drink at the point of a gun. Nonetheless there does seem to be
something distinctly odd if I now desire to bring about these facts or
even wish they would transpire. Under what circumstances would I
want to be drinking a beer I don’t want or even positively shun? If the
oddity were parallel to Moorean absurdity then my omissive desire
would be self-frustrating. The parallel explanation would require that
desire collect over conjunction:
If I now desire it be the case that (p & q) then I now desire it be the
case that p and I now desire it be the case that q.
So in now desiring it now be the case that (p & I don’t now desire that
it be the case that p) I would desire it now be the case that p, which
would frustrate the fulﬁllment of my higher-order desire. In other
words the fulﬁllment of my desire to now drink a beer to which I’m
indiﬀerent would result in a desire for beer that frustrates my desire
to be indiﬀerent to it. In the commissive case, now desiring it be the
case that (p & I now desire that it be the case that not-p) would be
fulﬁlled only if I now desire that it be the case that not-p. But since I
also desire it now be the case that p, I would have contradictory
desires, only one of which can be fulﬁlled. In other words the ful-
ﬁllment of my desire to now drink a beer I want to avoid would result
in wanting that beer as well as wanting to avoid it.
WITTGENSTEIN, MOOREAN ABSURDITY 249
This can’t be correct however. Although it would be kinky of me
to now want you to force me to do something I don’t want to do, we
can readily imagine circumstances in which pursuing the kinky desire
would not be irrational or self-frustrating (we may hastily avoid the
details). The reason for this is that desire does not always distribute
over conjunction. Surely I can want to drink beer with lemonade
without wanting to drink beer and without wanting to drink lem-
onade. Likewise I may reasonably desire a beating I want to avoid,
because in so doing, I do not desire a beating, only a beating I want to
avoid. Indeed if I were to desire a beating, that would spoil all the
fun! If I get what I want then my desire to avoid a beating will be
frustrated. But that doesn’t matter because the highest order desire is
trumps. In other words, the fulﬁlment of that desire is all that
matters.
Since I can sensibly desire analogues of Moore’s example, desire is
more like supposition than belief. A further similarity lies in the fact
that as a good Buddhist, I may sensibly desire to have no desires. But
desire is still not as laisser-faire as supposition since it is still irrational
of me to hold self-contradictory desires. My sincere desire to have a
series of monogamous aﬀairs with lots of diﬀerent women at the same
time may be understandable, but is one it would be practically irra-
tional for me to pursue. This shows a contrast between wanting and
wishing. If I know that a state of aﬀairs will never come to pass, I
may sensibly wish that state of aﬀairs were to come to pass but I
cannot sensibly want to bring it about. Thus I may sensibly wish I
were 10 years younger although I cannot sensibly want to make
myself 10 years younger.
NOTES
1 Here I take ‘‘if’’ as implication. Although such an inference is generally invalid,
most would allow it here. For example, Stalnaker 1975 and 1984 would allow it on
pragmatic grounds since here you don’t know which disjunct is true. If we symbolise
‘‘I believe that p’’ as ‘‘Bp’’ we have the following proof:
1. (p & Bp) Suppose the falsehood of Moorean assertion
2. p v Bp De Morgan’s Law
3. p v Bp  elim
4. p ! Bp ! equivalence.
2 As a reviewer has pointed out, there is more that could be said about the
conditions under which assertion distributes over conjunction. For one thing, a
conjunctive assertion must surely be an assertion of conjuncts both of which are
semantically coherent, unlike, say, an attempt to assert that ‘‘2 plus 2 is 4 and
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green ideas sleep furiously’’. In such a case I would not have succeeded in making
a bona ﬁde assertion since the conjunction as a whole is unintelligible.
3 Sorensen coins these useful terms in (1988, 16). This diﬀerence in formalism is
disguised by Moore’s examples. This is one reason to think that Moore himself did
not see the diﬀerence. If we formalise ‘‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t
believe that I did’’ as ‘‘p & Bp’’ then ‘‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has
not’’ becomes ‘‘Bp & p’’. By commutation this yields ‘‘p & Bp’’. To achieve
canonical reference to belief this may be represented as ‘‘p & Bp’’.
4 If a lack of belief that p entailed a belief that not-p then agnosticism would be
impossible:
1. Bp ! Bp Suppose.
2. Bp & Bp Suppose agnosticism
3. Bp 2, &-elim
4. Bp 3, 1.
5. Bp 2, &-elim
6. Bp & Bp 4,5, &-intro. Contradiction.
And the converse entailment would prohibit contradictory beliefs:
1. Bp ! Bp Suppose.
2. Bp & Bp Suppose contradictory beliefs
3. Bp 2, &-elim
4. Bp 2, &-elim
5. Bp 4, 1, MP
6. Bp & Bp 3,5, &-intro. Contradiction.
5 As a reviewer has pointed out, there is another pragmatic sense of ‘‘suppose’’. If
you ask me whether it is raining as I peer uncertainly through a semi-opaque win-
dow, I might reply ‘‘I suppose so’’. This seems to be roughly equivalent to saying ‘‘ I
believe so’’, while acknowledging a lack of conﬁdence in the existence of rain. I take
this to be a peripheral sense that is not the one that I discuss.
6 This constraint is anticipated in Wolgast (1977, 118).
7 So although Rosenthal may be correct in claiming that ‘‘Moore’s paradox occurs
with sentences. . . which are self-defeating in a way that prevents one from making an
assertion with them’’ (2002, 167), this claim is too narrow as a deﬁnition of Moorean
absurdity.
8 This constraint on explanation is recognised by Williams (1979, 1998, §2), De
Almeida (2001, 30) and Heal (1994, 6). Ha´jek and Stoljar’s (2001, 209) diagnosis of
the absurdity of commissive Moorean assertion – that I express contradictory beliefs
(because I assert that p and so express a belief that p and also assert that I believe that
not-p and so express a belief that not-p) – does not apply to the omissive assertion.
9 As De Almeida (2001, 42) notes, I need the minimal intelligence to present myself
with such an argument for the absurdity. But this hardly constitutes an objection.
10 Against De Almeida’s objection (2001, 42–43). The tripartite distinction between
holding a self-contradictory belief, as when I believe that (p and not-p), holding a
pair of contradictory beliefs, as when I believe that p and I believe that not-p and
holding an inconsistent set of beliefs, as when I believe that p and believe that q and
believe that not-(p and q) is the distinction between believing something that con-
tradicts itself, holding a pair of beliefs that contradict each other and holding a set of
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beliefs that cannot all be true. The distinction is underpinned by the fact that belief
does not collect over conjunction. Some commentators (for example De Almeida
himself 2001) make the same distinction by describing beliefs as ‘‘contradictory’’,
‘‘strongly inconsistent’’ and ‘‘weakly inconsistent’’.
11 Compare Williams (1996, §7).
12 However Rosenthal (1995, 203) rejects this approach based on the claim that a
Moorean assertion is ‘‘absurd even in soliloquy, where no betrayal of insincerity is
relevant; one cannot [coherently] say even to oneself ‘It’s raining but I don’t think it
is’ ’’. But this is a bad example, since soliloquy is apt to be absurd anyway. Unless
soliloquy is merely a stage performance, in which case it is just the pretence of
assertion, isn’t talking to myself a sign of madness? For example if I tell myself that p
as an attempt to let myself know that p, then the attempt is pointless since I already
have the knowledge I’m trying to impart. On my account we can explain the
absurdity of omissive Moorean soliloquy as my attempt to make myself both believe
that I believe that it’s raining (in virtue of making myself believe I’m sincere) and
believe that I don’t believe that it’s raining (in virtue of making myself think I’m
telling the truth). The absurdity is now revealed as my attempt to make myself
irrational. On the other hand if my soliloquy is merely a stage performance then I
have depicted this absurd attempt on the part of my ﬁctional guise, although I have
not made an assertion myself, absurd or otherwise.
13 However Rosenthal (1995, 199, compare Ha´jek and Stoljar 2001) denies this. He
holds that by asserting that p I express the belief that p, but in reporting that I believe
that p, I do not express this belief (2002, 168). Rosenthal assumes that since my
report of belief, ‘‘I believe that p’’ expresses my higher order belief that I believe that
p, then it cannot also express my belief that p as well. For he also assumes that if it
did, then there would be no diﬀerence between reporting a belief by ‘‘I believe that p’’
and expressing a belief by ‘‘p’’. On my account both assumptions are false. For my
assertion ‘‘I believe that p’’ both expresses my belief that I believe that p and also
expresses my belief that p. But this does not mean that there is no diﬀerence between
reporting a belief by ‘‘I believe that p’’ and expressing a belief by ‘‘p’’. The diﬀerence
is that in making the plain assertion ‘‘p’’ I do not express a belief that I believe that p.
14 Searle (1983, 9) claims that a ‘‘generalisation of Moore’s paradox’’ occurs with
non-assetoric speech-acts:
. . .in the performance of each illocutionary act with a propositional content, we
express a certain Intentional state with that propositional content, and that Inten-
tional state is the sincerity condition of that type of speech act.
Accordingly, Searle’s list of illocutionary acts that violate their sincerity conditions
constitutes ‘‘I order you to stop smoking but I don’t want you to stop smoking’’, ‘‘I
apologize for insulting you, but I am not sorry that I insulted you’’, and ‘‘Con-
gratulations on winning the prize, but I am not glad that you won the prize’’. Also
included by his account would be ‘‘I promise to visit you next Thursday but I don’t
intend to’’. For dissent however, see Heal 1977.
15 Ha´jek and Stoljar (2001, 209) make this point.
16 This account is similar to Rosenthal’s (2002). He observes that ‘‘one must, at the
time of assertion, have an occurrent thought with that content’’ (2002, 170). So
Moore’s omissive example ‘‘. . . is not assertible because one conjunct denies the
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occurrence at that time of the occurrent intentional state required for the other
conjunct to perform a genuine illocutionary act’’ (2002, 170). So in asserting that (p
& I don’t believe that p), I deny that I have the occurrent belief that p, one that I
must have if my assertion that p is to be bona ﬁde. Rosenthal would say that the
commissive assertion is not assertible because one conjunct asserts the occurrence at
that time of an intentional state ‘‘manifestly incompatible’’ (2002, 170) with that
required for the other conjunct to perform a genuine illocutionary act. So in asserting
that (p & I believe that not-p), I assert that I have the occurrent belief that not-p, one
that I cannot have if my assertion that p is to be bona ﬁde, unless I hold contradictory
occurrent beliefs about whether p.
But when I address Superman by saying ‘‘You are not an idiot but I believe that
you are’’ the ‘‘belief the second conjunct . . . reports is, by contrast, not occurrent
at the time of assertion; it is merely something I am disposed to mentally aﬃrm
under other circumstances’’ (2002, 170). So my reply to Superman roughly means
‘‘You are not an idiot but I am inclined (under other circumstances) to think you
are’’. Of an omissive variant of my reply, ‘‘You are not an idiot but I don’t believe
you are not’’, Rosenthal would presumably say that the second conjunct merely
reports, at the time of assertion, the lack of my disposition to mentally aﬃrm
idiocy under other circumstances. So my omissive reply to Superman roughly
means ‘‘You are not an idiot but I am not inclined (under other circumstances) to
think you are not’’.
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